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PR
Ghana—UN soldiers meet Congolese girls in Leopoldville.—Wide World photo

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The United Nations

A Refuge of Sanity in a Silly World

By JAMES RESTON

(From the *New York Times*)

The United Nations is getting more rave notices these days than any show in New York. There has hardly been a time in its 15 years when somebody wasn't writing its obituary, but here it is enjoying more prestige than the League of Nations in its heyday.

Part of the reason for this, ironically, is that the basic principle on which the UN was based has collapsed. This was that the five "great powers"—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China—could agree on how peace was to be maintained.

Instead, they have agreed on nothing except that war is an unmitigated nuisance. Beyond that, they have split apart; the normal functions of bilateral diplomacy between East and West have broken down, and in the confusion the United Nations has been summoned to help fill the gap.

If It Didn't Exist . . .

This was what it was doing at 4:24 the morning of August 9 just before the sun came up over the East River. It was providing a forum for discussion of the Congo tragedy. It was devising an instrument of authority, no matter how weak, which could bring some sanity into an essentially chaotic situation.

If it had not been in existence, probably nothing could have avoided a highly dangerous race by the great nations into Africa to keep each other from influencing the course of future events in that convulsive continent.

In the present state of diplomatic relations between East and West, it is unlikely that agreement could have been reached between Washington and Moscow on what should be done. But in the all-night debate both the United States and the Soviet Union were able to agree, as they have had to do in several crises in the past, to trust in the intervention of the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld.

The Art of Precision

This remarkable man is proving to be one of the great natural resources in the world today, and it is difficult to think of another in the field of world diplomacy who could do the job as well.

He is tireless. He is infinitely patient. He is sensitive to the slightest troublesome breeze in the world. He knows exactly what his job will

let him do and forbid him from doing. And he knows when to be ambiguous; he knows when to be precise.

When he said August 8 that the Congo was "a question of peace or war", the Security Council paid attention because he does not use three-letter words often or carelessly.

When the Soviet delegate condemned him for refusing to give the order to the United Nations force to fight its way into the Katanga Province of the Congo, he replied very quietly: "I do not believe personally that we help the Congolese people by actions in which Africans kill Africans or Congolese kill Congolese."

It may be said that the UN, with its sympathy for the principle of self-determination, has in the past helped encourage people to battle for independence before they were ready for independence, but that is another story.

The Skill Required

The point is that Hammarskjöld did not write the Charter of the UN, but merely interprets it in the face of jealous and quarrelsome nations who have hired him to do a job and given him extremely vague and limited powers in the process.

That he has exercised these powers with such skill as to win the respect, if not the affection, of the contending states is one reason why the UN is now a refuge for common sense in a satanic world. Not so long ago it was being vilified in this country as a hotbed of spies. Now it is popular enough to be used by the Republican Vice-Presidential nominee, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., as a platform for political success. And that, as the man said, is progress.

Columbia Undertakes Linguistics Project

A major linguistics project, with the two-fold purpose of conducting research into West Africa's 300 to 400 vernacular languages and training African students in the methods of linguistic research, has been undertaken by Columbia University under a \$176,000 Ford Foundation grant. The project will be directed by Professor Joseph H. Greenberg of Columbia's Anthropology Department, a linguistics specialist with extensive experience in West Africa.

The Malgache Republic

An Economic Profile



—French Press and Information

By HENK F. KOLFF

Editor, *Africa Economic Newsletter*

AT 11 O'CLOCK in the morning of Saturday, June 26, 1960, Madagascar—the "Big Isle" off Africa's east coast—became the fully independent Malgache Republic. At that moment, France formally relinquished the few remaining, though important, competences—defense, finance, foreign affairs—which had been retained under the constitution which came into force when the French Community was born out of General Charles de Gaulle's referendum of September 28, 1958.

More than 60 years of close economic, cultural, and political association with France have left their indelible mark, however, and the new republic has elected to retain close economic ties with France, and to remain politically associated with Paris through a revised Community patterned on the Commonwealth of English-speaking peoples. The final convention signed between the two countries just before independence is almost entirely devoted to economic interrelationships.

Malgache Origins Obscure

The French era in Madagascar dates back to Gallieni, the reformer who laid the foundation for today's democratic state in the nine years of his rule from 1896 to 1905. Much of the island's previous history remains shrouded in mystery, and opinions differ as to whether Madagascar should, in truth, be regarded as belonging to Africa at all. The theory has been propounded that the Malgache people—who retain a degree of cultural homogeneity rare in Africa—might originally stem from Indonesia, whence they came in outrigger canoes, hugging the southern shores of Asia, then

coming down Africa's east coast to mix with African elements before finally settling on the island. There is no doubt that the Malgache is vastly different from any of the mainland races.

Agriculture Predominates

Of Madagascar's 5,000,000 inhabitants, about 4,000,000 live, either directly or indirectly, from the land, and fully three-quarters of the working population is engaged in agricultural or pastoral pursuits. Altogether, more than 1,500,000 of the people are agricultural workers (farmers, smallholders, and farm laborers), which compares with about 185,000 in industry, 125,000 in commerce, 110,000 in the public services, 75,000 in building and construction, 55,000 in transport services, and less than 30,000 in the mining industry.

Correspondingly, the agricultural sector contributes more than 90 percent of Madagascar's total exports. The two major crops are coffee and rice. The latter, being the staple food, is grown largely for domestic consumption; however, top qualities (under the name *riz-de-luxe*) are exported, mainly to France. Coffee (38,000 tons) accounted, in 1959, for almost one-third of the entire export income. In addition, the island produces some of the finest vanilla grown in the world and this comprised a further 12 percent of last year's exports. Rice came third (just over 6.5 percent), while sugar brought in 6 percent. Many varieties of other agricultural crops are also produced for the export market, and the island has a large ranching and meat-producing industry.

Agriculture and cattle raising are, therefore, the lifeblood of the economy. It is fortunate that production is so diversified, since two important crops—vanilla and cloves—are fighting a rear-guard action against the encroachment of synthetic essences and oils. Cane sugar, a newcomer to the economy, is no longer imported (to the benefit of the trade balance) and has, in a few years, become the fourth most important export product. Cotton is another crop which is coming into commercial production and this year's output is expected to reach 1,000 tons of lint. Increasing

the production of oilseeds, especially groundnuts, is also under consideration, and recently determined efforts have been launched to produce bananas as an export crop.

Mineral production is small, though Madagascar is the only producer—albeit on a small scale—of uraniferous minerals in the French sphere of influence. (Production is not scheduled to begin in Gabon, in Equatorial Africa, until 1961.) The principal minerals produced are graphite, mica, and some of the rarer quartzes and semiprecious stones. A long search for petroleum in the extensive sedimentary basin has, so far, been fruitless, and a large, but low-grade, coal field (Sakoa) remains untouched despite a number of schemes put forward from time to time for its exploitation.

Transport Limits Development

Lack of transport facilities—both roads and railroads are scarce because of the mountainous nature of the terrain—has been a factor in retarding industrial development. Nevertheless, largely through the efforts of the settled white population of about 75,000—the fourth largest white population in Africa south of the Sahara, after the Union of South Africa, the Rhodesian Federation, and the Congo—a vested commercial and industrial sector of considerable range and stability exists.

The industrial sector comprises some "transformation" industries (i.e., factories for the primary processing of agricultural products). They include plants for the hulling of rice and the making of rice flour; for the manufacture of sugar, rum, and tapioca; and oil expressing mills. The island boasts a small number of secondary industries, of which the more important are a textile mill for the manufacture of cotton cloth and another for the making of bags, partly from locally-grown fiber and partly from imported jute; a cement factory, breweries, and a few smaller industries. The greater part of the island's everyday requirements—in consumer as well as in capital goods—is imported, largely from France. In view of the relatively high freight rates due to the exceptionally long haul, this is an important contribu-

tory factor in the current high cost of living.

Financial Problems

Since the new Malgache Republic is almost entirely a primary producer country and its exports therefore subject to the fluctuations of world market prices, it has at present an unusually large trade deficit. In 1959, this deficit amounted to \$44,300,000, and only 63.2 percent of imports were covered by exports. The fact that this coverage was lower than the 76.2 percent of 1958 must have been partly due to the results of the cyclone damage of March 1959. But the figures for the first quarter of this year show a still lower coverage of 59.7 percent, which represented a deficit of nearly \$12,500,000 in three months.

Although serious efforts are being made to step up, diversify, and improve agricultural production, such programs take time to make their effect felt. Uncertainties regarding price and markets for certain products—e.g., exports of coffee are limited at present under international agreement—also militate against any great immediate improvement.

The only way the gap in the payments balance might be bridged in the foreseeable future would be by: (1) a drastic curtailment of imports, which would be politically risky in that it would imply a fall in the living standards and/or reduction in capital development works; (2) a large-scale inflow of private investment capital, of which there is little indication at the present juncture; or (3) large-scale foreign aid and/or loans.

For the short term, loan and aid programs are likely to play an increasingly important role in the republic's financial structure. In 1959, the *Fonds d'Aide et Cooperation* (FAC)—the development and aid fund of the French Community which took the place of the old FIDES—granted credits in favor of Madagascar amounting to some \$8,000,000. In 1960 these credits are expected to total not less than \$22,500,000. In addition, the European Economic Community (i.e., Common Market) development fund for associated territories (FEDOM) last year made available to Madagascar credits to the value of \$4,000,000, thus honoring an undertaking given after the cyclone disaster to make its very first credits available for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the stricken land. In March of this year, three agreements were concluded for social and economic development projects: two with FAC for, respectively, \$1,600,000 and \$650,000, and one with FEDOM for \$3,500,000.

The president of the EEC, Walter Hallstein of West Germany, said in Tananarive on August 5 that the European development fund had, by that date, approved credits in favor of Madagascar amounting to \$14,125,000, of which 47 percent is earmarked

The Malgache Republic

Area:	241,094 square miles.
Population:	4,918,000 in 1958, including 74,100 Europeans
Capital:	Tananarive (population 194,000 including 30,000 Europeans).
Internal Communications:	16,156 miles of roads. Four railways, comprising a total of 530 miles.
Religion:	Christian and pagan.
Chief of State:	President Philibert Tsiranana, <i>Parti Sociale Democrat</i> .
Major Political Parties:	The moderate <i>Parti Social Democrat Malgache</i> has a sizeable majority in both the upper and lower houses of Parliament. Of the several other political parties active on the island, the only one potentially capable of unseating the Socialists is the <i>Ankoto Kongresyny Fahalevatana Malagasy</i> (AKFM), a Communist-front organization. In the municipal elections of October 1959, AKFM (then operating under the name <i>Parti du Congres pour l'Independence de Madagascar</i>) won control of the city councils in the capital city of Tananarive and in Diego Suarez and also demonstrated a substantial following in Tamatave, Madagascar's principal port.
Next General Elections:	Due not later than 1961. Vote by universal popular suffrage.

for the infrastructure of the island's communications systems, 37 percent for agricultural schemes, and 16 percent for social services.

Careful Planning Required

The 1959 budget required supplementary French aid to the extent of \$2,400,000, but the government succeeded in balancing its 1960 budget at \$67,300,000 by reducing capital expenditures to a minimum this year, taking \$81,000 from reserve funds, and carrying forward an unused balance of \$1,600,000 from the 1959 capital expenditure budget.

The government, under the able leadership of President Philibert Tsiranana, is fully alive to the need for hard work and careful planning, which probably explains why many on the island retain an optimistic viewpoint despite the obvious difficulties ahead. Tsiranana has embarked on a rigorous economy drive within the administration, calling for drastic cuts in salaries and allowances, and an almost complete embargo on all foreign travel by parliamentarians.

About 2,400 Frenchmen are remaining in civil service posts (though under full Malgache control), pending the eventual emergence of enough fully-trained indigenous personnel to take over. This will cost some \$17,400,000 a year, of which France will pay \$11,400,000 under a FAC program. Through France, the republic has made formal application to continue as an "associated

territory" of the EEC (Common Market) which would not only ensure continued FEDOM aid, but would also, in the longer term, probably provide wider markets for Madagascar's products. At present, half of the island's total exports go to France and nearly three-quarters to the combined countries of the "franc" monetary zone. Almost 15 percent—mainly coffee—is sold to the United States.

Because of the republic's limited resources, investment capital will have to come largely from outside, and the hope is that private interests will follow the lead given by FAC and FEDOM administrators. A mission from the EEC countries toured the island in June 1960 and it is possible that this visit may lead to the establishment of further processing and small-scale industries. A private mission from the United States, sponsored jointly by Westinghouse and the Koppers Corporation, visited the island earlier this year to assess its potentialities.

It is possible that the Common Market countries may eventually, as a group, replace France as the island's principal trade partner and that capital investments from this broader grouping may be expanded. It is unlikely, however, that such economic changes will affect the French cultural influence, which continues to permeate every sphere of Madagascar's life today.

Sources of Tension In West Africa

By W. ARTHUR LEWIS*

THERE are five major sources of international tension today in what we know as West Africa—(1) the division of the area into British and French spheres of influence; (2) the lack of education, which helps to maintain that division; (3) the mix-up of tribes and religions, which menaces the stability of each of these states; (4) frontier questions; and (5) the federal idea, which is meant to reduce tension, but which so far has only increased it.

In 1957 there was in this area only one independent state—Liberia, which was really a satellite of the United

The Author

William Arthur Lewis, a West Indian by birth, has been Principal of the University College of the West Indies since 1959. Before that, he was a lecturer at the London School of Economics, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Manchester, Reader in Colonial Economics at the University of London, and the UN-appointed Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister of Ghana (1957-58). He has also served on many official groups concerned with economic development. Dr. Lewis is the author of four books and numerous articles in technical, economic, and law journals.

States. In addition, there were four British colonies, ten French colonies, and one Portuguese colony. These divisions have produced important cultural, economic, and political consequences. For example, there is virtually no cultural communication between "French" Africans and "British" Africans. The British-African intellectual knows what is happening in London's markets, theater, and politics, and the French-African knows what is happening in Paris, both in philosophy and at the opera. Neither, however, has much knowledge of what is happening in the territories next door.

Economic Ramifications

There is similar economic isolation. Currencies are exchanged only with difficulty. Transport facilities, whether roads, railways, or harbours, have been designed for political and not for economic convenience. Trade is parcelled up by tariffs. Above all,

*Summarized from a talk to the International Conference on World Tensions, University of Chicago, May 12, 1960.

there is political isolation, which is a continuing obstacle to the removal of other barriers. The French territories, although claiming independence, remain deeply attached to France, by sentimental as well as by economic ties, and are a little frightened of Ghana and Nigeria. French Africans and British Africans do not feel at home with each other, and it is going to take a lot of working together as independent states before they break down the barriers which now separate them.

The second weakness of these countries is their lack of education. When Ghana became independent, only one percent of its children were receiving a high school education, and this percentage is typical of West Africa as a whole. It has several consequences. Even when these countries become independent, they continue to depend upon the outside world to run their affairs. In the government, the ministers are African, but the civil servants and the technicians are still British or French, which helps to perpetuate divisions. Large scale private business is largely run by foreigners. Moreover, the cost of any kind of development is very high, since it has to be done with foreign staff paid at high rates. Nothing could do more to put West Africa on its feet economically than a large program of high school education.

Homogeneity Lacking

A third source of tension is the lack of national homogeneity in these countries. Each is a mixture of tribes, languages, and religions, without a sense of common history or of common nationhood. This is poor material for democracy. Many adjacent tribes are traditional enemies, having fought each other regularly right up to the beginning of the twentieth century. The new rulers in West Africa are trying to create modern states in which national loyalties will take the place of tribal loyalties. These men must, by the nature of the task, be revolutionaries, in the sense that their goals require that they break the power of tribal chiefs and the old family oligarchies. In these circumstances, politics is inevitably rough; its weapons are not so much the newspaper and the microphone, as the knife, the club, and the prison cell. At my last count, the opposition had

- Divisions into British and French spheres of influence
- Lack of adequate education
- Tribal and religious tension
- Frontier questions
- The federation issue

no seats in Parliament in five of these countries, and in three others the government had more than 80 percent of all the parliamentary seats.

Frontier disputes—a fourth source of tension—already involve Ghana, the Cameroons, and Gambia. The metropolitan powers kept only small forces in West Africa, but there are signs that this happy state may not long persist. In view of current talk of expanding armies, this is just the right time to promote in West Africa a convention for the limitation of armaments.

Prospects for Federation

I come lastly to the fifth source of tension, which might eventually offer the solution for all the others—the idea of a federation of West African states. Three different federal solutions have competed for West African attention since World War II.

First, there was the possibility that the French territories would form one federation and the British territories another. This was decisively rejected. As soon as Ghana became independent, it proceeded to destroy all its links with the other British territories—the common airline, the common currency, and the common research services—claiming that it could not continue in partnership with other territories which were still in colonial status.

As soon as the French territories received self-government, they destroyed the existing federation of French West Africa. In its place came the concept of federation with France in the French Community. This was at first accepted by all the French territories except Guinea, which chose independence. Now the others are following suit. Mauretania, Senegal, and Sudan are contracting out of the federal arrangements of the French Community, and the others will follow soon.

Finally there is the idea, championed by Ghana and by Guinea, of a federation of all West African states. In present circumstances this can hardly come to pass: the leaders distrust each other too much, and are not being subjected to the kind of outside pressure which seems to be a necessary prerequisite of meaningful federations.

Nevertheless, this is the topic of the day. Ghana and Guinea have al-



"While life in the capital cities is politically exciting . . . the excitements of life in the country, for the great mass of the people, are in economic progress—in new roads, new water supplies, new schools, buses, electricity, hospitals and other such fruits of progress . . ."

ready announced a union, and though this has not come to much, they are busily engaged in summoning conferences of other African leaders to work out a wider West African union. They can expect no help from Britain or from France, both of whose commonwealth aspirations are incompatible with local unions. The more serious danger is that aggressive initiatives by Ghana and by Guinea may frighten rather than conciliate other West African countries.

Politics Touches Few

Because I have focused exclusively on tension, I must have created a false picture of West Africa as a country grimy with hatreds and oppressions. This is not how most West Africans feel. Politics touches the lives of very few. In West Africa, as in so many other parts of the world, the rule of life, for the great majority of the people, is to find out who is in power and vote for him. While life in the capital cities is politically exciting, and the newspapers resound with speeches and threats, the excitements of life in the country, for the great mass of the people, are in economic progress—in new roads, new water supplies, new schools, buses, electricity, hospitals and other such fruits of progress, which are expanding rapidly throughout this area.

West Africa is really a quiet and prosperous place, except for handfuls of political leaders who are jockeying for position with each other. This jockeying has dangerous potentialities, because it may inflame the area, but at present its dangers are confined to the relatively few who choose to play this game.

What can the outside world do to help West Africa establish its new roots in the modern world?

Most important for the present is

a continuing flow of technical and financial aid. In addition to an inflow of capital, both private and public, West Africa needs hundreds of administrators and scientists. Particularly welcome are the beginnings of the United Nations civil service—the OPEX. Thousands of teachers are needed. West Africans prefer multilateral aid through the United Nations, but they will take aid from whatever source it comes, provided that it does not menace their independence. Current flows are small, a mere fraction of what is needed.

The outside world can also help in solving many basic problems by extending the services of existing international organizations on a regional basis. For example, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the regional conferences of such bodies as the FAO and ILO provide a framework for bringing West Africans together in a wider context. Private international organizations and private foundations are also effective in bringing West Africans together in circumstances where purely African initiatives might be less effective.

It is still possible that the West Africans may create sufficient of a federal system of their own to grapple with such obstacles as tariffs, currencies, passports, communicable diseases, the organization of scientific research, and the peculiar design of transportation systems. In lieu of such federation, existing international institutions offer the most promising framework for their solution.

Keep "Cold War" Out

The United Nations could also play a constructive role in solving frontier problems and in preventing war. If the cold war can be kept out of West Africa, as it has been so far, the

Security Council may find itself quite usefully occupied in sorting out local political disputes over the next 10 years or so, such as the disputes between Ghana and her neighbors, or between Gambia and Senegal. The Security Council, which seems almost to have withered away, may find new life in Africa.

Above all, the outside world can help West Africa through this transitional stage by insisting on judging Africans by the same standards as other people. I say this because the relations which now exist between Africans and liberals in the rest of the world are somewhat unbalanced. Africans, like Asians and Latin Americans, tend to take a holier-than-thou attitude towards Europe and North America, which are freely criticized for their shortcomings. Indeed, in recent months in the UN, the African bloc has tended to take a holier-than-thou attitude even towards the Asians and the Latin Americans.

Realism Required

On the other hand, liberals in Europe and America tend to be mealy-mouthed about what is going on in Africa, as if to say that an African nationalist can do no wrong. This ignores the fact that African nationalists do not think alike. Some are ruthless bosses on the Huey Long pattern. Others are subtle and sophisticated liberal statesmen, who would bring distinction to political office in any country in the world. Such men as Olympio in Togoland or Awolowo in Nigeria are seeking to set new political standards in West Africa, and to create new and healthy political traditions. They are not helped when liberals in the outside world keep silent in face of African atrocities or pay homage to men who behave like gangsters.

The best way to treat Africans is to treat them as equals, recognizing that some are good and some bad, some are highly educated while others are illiterate, some have good sense while others are silly—in short that they are just like other people, neither better nor worse. The unequal treatment of the past underlies most of the current tensions; spoiling present-day nationalist leaders with indiscriminate adulation is an equally serious risk.

Given aid, West Africans will make their contribution, in their turn, to the rest of the world. Here we have peoples whose tradition it is to be gay, artistic, and colorful. They are launched upon exciting tasks—building new societies, making new parliaments and federations, pursuing rapid economic development, and reaching out into the wider world as partners in the task of creating a new world society, which is the challenge to all of us. This is one of the most fascinating corners of the world. We may rest assured that as they find their feet, its peoples will prove to be among the most attractive members of the human race.

GHANA TIGHTENS BOYCOTT

Ghana and Malaya simultaneously invoked a total ban on the importation of goods from South Africa on August 1, emphasizing anew the tension within the Commonwealth over the Union's racial policies. In addition, Ghana has banned the entry or transit through its territory of all South Africans except those who declare their opposition to apartheid and racial discrimination, and has closed use of its ports, anchorages, and airports to South African ships and aircraft except in case of distress. South Africans working in Ghana—mainly in the mining industry—will not be affected until they go on leave and reenter, when the restrictions will apply to them. Ghana's action implements one of the resolutions of the recent Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa (*Africa Special Report*, July 1960).

Ghana's restrictions apply to all South African and South West African goods, from wherever they are shipped. Specific import licenses will be needed even for personal effects and goods sent by mail. The Union exported over £2,200,000 worth of goods to Ghana in 1959, and imported £1,000,000 worth of goods from Ghana.

Other Boycotts Noted

In other recent boycott developments, an American ship was not permitted to unload a cargo of Union goods in the West Indies; Norway and Sweden have stopped buying fresh fruit; and the Sudan has rejected South African bids totalling over £100,000. The total impact is not yet clear, since both government and voluntary boycotts by consumers, trade unions, and other groups must be taken into account. The Union Government is studying the total effect of the boycott on the Union's trade, which has been estimated as high as £7,000,000 to date. The effect of the boycott is compounded because it occurred at a time when the Union's efforts to expand its foreign markets had begun to show results.

Industries hit by cancelled bids and boycotts include primarily fish canning, clothing, film distribution, auto spare parts, asbestos piping, glass products, hardboard, tires, peanut oil, sugar, flour, fresh fruit, and wine and brandy.

South African officials do not admit that the boycotts are serious, pointing out that total exports are up by £22,000,000 during the first half of 1960 over the first half of 1959. Dr. N. Diederichs, Minister of Economic Affairs, urged the few industries hit by boycotts to consult the Union Depart-

ment of Commerce for assistance in finding alternative markets.

The affected businessmen do not accept the government's calm attitude, however. The *Financial Times* reports that goods are increasingly being made for export without the label "Made in South Africa." One prominent exporter has said the government should bear the losses to exporters resulting from returns of goods, since official racial policies are the cause. There have also been some counter-boycotts by businesses in the Union, notably on Swedish cars and Norwegian fish.

US BANKS TO BE IN NIGERIA

Two United States banks were presented with Nigerian banking licences during Federal Minister of Finance, Festus S. Okotie-Eboh's visit to the United States in July. The Bank of America will become the first American commercial bank in Nigeria when it opens its branch in Lagos in August; this will also be the Bank's first branch in Africa. The Chase Manhattan Bank of New York plans to open its Lagos branch in January 1961.

TRADE PACT PROTESTED

The new five year trade agreement between the Union of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, effective July 1, opens the Union market to several expanding Rhodesian industries and assures South African exporters a Commonwealth preference in the Federation even if Union ties with the Commonwealth are broken. Despite these mutual gains, businessmen in both countries have protested the pact.

In the Union, the affected manufacturers and exporters are unhappy because of the intrusion of the Federation products into the Union, the unilateral restrictions which the agreement permits either trading partner to impose, and the higher duties now faced by some £20,000,000 of Union exports of manufactured goods to the Federation. Prime Minister Verwoerd admitted that the agreement is not what the government hoped for, but emphasized that it provides the basis for a healthy and expanding exchange of goods, though it may necessitate a change in the commodity composition of Union exports to the Federation.

The agreement is similar to the preceding 1955 agreement in its exemption of all goods from import control by either country, except specified agricultural products which are duty-free under permits issued by the Ministries of Agriculture. Where the new agreement differs is in its

treatment of non-agricultural products. Two million pounds of Federation leaf tobacco will be permitted into the Union duty-free, and Federation cigarettes will continue to get a rebate of part of the Union duty. Several Federation exports, especially certain textiles, knitwear, radios, and canvas footwear, are to be given more preferential treatment by the Union than before. Union products, except for the exempted agricultural products, will have the same tariff levied on them by the Federation as is levied on goods from other self-governing members of the Commonwealth.

GUINEA HAS INVESTMENT LAW

Guinea published recently its first detailed post-independence law on foreign investments, which specifically permits private foreign investment providing it conforms to the economic policy of the state and is calculated to have a favorable effect on the balance of payments. Investors may either participate with the state in mixed enterprises on an agreed basis or organize themselves into private Guinean companies in accordance with Guinea's company law. In the latter case, they may not be granted a monopolistic position or special privileges.

The transfer of profits, amortization funds, and expatriate workers' savings are guaranteed, but in conformity with exchange control regulations, and the decree authorizing the investment will fix transferable quotas for profits and amortization funds. Authorization for transfer will be granted according to the state of the balance of payments, but neither unlimited permission to transfer nor most-favored-nation treatment can be granted.

Under the new law, authorized investors are guaranteed against all exploitation (*spoliation*) and are protected by the state, but in case of vital necessity for the country's economy, the government reserves the right to repurchase private enterprises or the private portion of the mixed enterprise "under conditions which will be fixed liberally by agreement between the parties."

This overall law does not apply to mining, insurance, and air and sea transport companies, or banks, all of which will be regulated under specific regulation.

Foreign investors, whether companies or individuals, are forbidden all political activity and all forms of interference in the internal affairs of Guinea. Their recruitment of personnel outside Guinea is subject to government approval.

—Norman W. Mosher

Information Media in Mali

By a Correspondent in Dakar

All of the African nations which have emerged from colonial status have felt it necessary to create Ministries of Information to watch over and feed internal communications media. Particularly in the former French territories, where radio has always been emphasized and the private press is far less developed than in comparable British territories, the government plays the primary role in shaping and educating public opinion.

The absence of a well-established press in Mali is a symptom rather than a reason for the predominance of radio. In conformity with French centralist tradition, the colonial administration made no effort to prime the pump (as the British often did) to get the indigenous press on sound footing. Instead, France concentrated its energies on the creation of a comprehensive network of radio stations throughout its African areas.

Dakar Was Radio Center

The French radio network, from which Mali's present facilities derive, was set up in the 1950's by the *Société de Radiodiffusion de la France d'Outre Mer*, a state company created by a French engineer and composer, Pierre Schaeffer. SORAFORM, which controlled 21 stations at the time of the September 1958 referendum, developed programs, documents, and records; provided personnel for the various stations; and trained every year 30 young Africans for radio work.

SORAFORM originally paid for all the running expenses of the stations, but eventually went over to a combined financing scheme under which the local governments paid 30 to 50 percent of the annual budget. New equipment was paid for through FIDES (*Fonds d'investissement pour le développement économique et social*), France's colonial fund. Relations between this body and the French Broadcasting Service (*Radiodiffusion-télévision française*) are maintained by a "personal union" at the top: the director of the RTF is also the president of the board of directors of SORAFORM.

One of the most important stations of the SORAFORM network was Radio AOF in Dakar. After the referendum in 1958, the consequent breakup of the former Federation of French West Africa, and the formation of the Mali Federation early in 1959, a dispute arose between Mali and SORAFORM over control of the Dakar station. In June 1959, Radio Dakar went temporarily dead while an agreement was negotiated which permitted the Mali federal govern-

ment to operate the station without help from SORAFORM.

Meanwhile, a Senegal radio station which had been operating under the control of SORAFORM in Saint-Louis was moved to Dakar when the Senegalese capital was transferred there. The result is that today there are two radio stations in Dakar: a federal one under the exclusive control of the federal Minister of Information and a Senegalese station jointly operated by the Senegalese Ministry of Information and the French SORAFORM.

Three Stations Compared

Radio Mali—which bought a 100 kw transmitter in 1959—is by far the larger station in both personnel and equipment, and programs are designed to emphasize its role as the prestige station of the Federation. The station gives prominence to the declarations of Mali statesmen, and the news programs are pointedly neutralist in their approach to international developments. (Detailed reporting of local events is left to Radio Senegal and Bamako's Radio Soudan.) Although most of the programs are in French, some English and Portuguese newscasts are used in an effort to gain listeners in neighboring Sierra Leone, Ghana, Portuguese Guinea, and Cabo Verde. There are no transmissions in vernacular languages.

Radio Senegal has only two small-scale transmitters of 4 kw and 1 kw respectively and the station is still housed provisionally in inadequate quarters in Dakar. Its audience is supposed to be exclusively Senegalese and therefore prominence is given to programs in local vernaculars (about three hours a day) and African music. The influence of the Moslem brotherhoods is strong in Radio Senegal, and much time is devoted to songs of the brethren of the Tidjania, Qadria, and Murid sects and to sermons or lectures on the Koran. Despite these efforts, the search for an "African style" in broadcasting has plagued Radio Senegal as it has Radio Guinea in the past year, and so far no definite success has been obtained. One reason for the inadequacies of the vernacular transmissions is that they are entrusted to the lowest-paid and least-educated personnel of the station. Work in the French-speaking departments is considered by African employees as a promotion.

Audience Reaction Tested

A poll recently organized to find out the tastes of the audience revealed a strong tendency toward cultural isolationism. Programs on African his-

tory are highly esteemed, though only when the facts are disproportionately slanted. Although prudent attempts to open up perspectives on the outer world meet with relatively little enthusiasm, the Ministry of Information of Senegal is aware of its educational responsibilities and the programs continue to go beyond audience demand. However, lack of capable personnel still accounts for hours of "afro-cuban" music.

Radio Senegal's news programs are more factual than those of Radio Mali and no bias is visible in the presentation of the events—a major accomplishment in view of the constant interventions of various political and other personalities to present particular points of view. Radio Senegal, like Radio Mali, has newscasts in English and in Portuguese. Since



Press • Radio • Television



early June, Arabic transmissions have also been introduced for the large Lebanese and Syrian colony in the country.

Radio Soudan, with a far smaller personnel than its sister station in the Senegal, has made more progress toward a distinctive African style, perhaps because the traditional structures are less diluted in the Soudan than in Senegal. In keeping with the general political orientation of Soudan's governing elite, however, news is interpreted along lines somewhat to the left of Radio Senegal.

Expansion Planned

Having inaugurated its 100 kw transmitter on independence day, June 20, 1960, Radio Mali will go over in the very near future to almost round the clock broadcasting, concen-

trating increasingly on neighboring countries. Television seems imminent, though its impact will remain limited to the cities for a long time. Television has been a bone of political contention between the federation and the states, but it appears that the federation has provisionally won the competition.

Radio Senegal will increase the power of its Dakar station to 25 kw and will build another transmitter at Ziguinchor in the Southern Casamance region. Radio Soudan plans to add a relay-transmitter at Segou or Timbuctu to cover the eastern regions of Soudan, at present being neglected since the capital city of Bamako lies in the west of this vast country.

The local stations of Radios Senegal and Soudan will mainly broadcast in vernacular languages, while the central state stations at Dakar and Bamako beam their broadcasts to the entire country and will probably be able to use largely French. Radio Senegal will thus be relieved of the heavy burden of repeating the same program matter in six languages (Ouolof, Toucouleur, Serere, Mandingo, Diola and Sarakholle), and thus a greater variety of programs and enhanced educational content will be possible.

The Press is Weak

Count Charles de Breteuil's *Paris-Dakar*, with an annual income of 100 million francs and a daily circulation of 20,000, has been for 25 years the most prosperous and widely-read newspaper in the area. Edited by de Breteuil's son in Dakar, it offers unbiased news coverage and a special page of *faits divers* which is flown in mat form from Paris to each of the newspapers in Breteuil's African chain. (He holds forth also in Tangier, Abidjan, Douala, and Cotonou.) Political opinion, such as it is, is limited to a weekly page of innocuous *Opinions africaines* in the form of "letters to the editor."

Another de Breteuil venture in Mali is the highly successful *Bingo*, a non-political monthly printed in Dakar for African audiences. Connections with the American *Ebony* and South Africa's *Drum* entitle it to a variety of illustrated articles.

A more rough and tumble representative of the private press is the bitterly satirical *Les Echos d'Afrique Noire*—a one-man venture born in Guinea, but transferred to Dakar in 1947. It has frequently changed its orientation though not its editor, and currently is a staunch defender of Guinean policies under Sekou Toure. Under the colonial administration, several trials for libel were started against Editor Maurice Voisin, but no

action has been taken against the newspaper since information became a responsibility of the autonomous Senegalese Government.

Party Organs Play Key Role

Among the political party organs, the most important are the weekly *L'Essor*, published by *Union Soudanaise*, the governing party in the Soudan, and its counterpart in Senegal, the weekly *Unité* of the dominant *Union Progressiste*. (Although these parties are actually sections of the one leading party of Mali, *Parti Fédérale Africain*, they maintain their autonomy and their original names for local purposes.) Both of the major party organs are in fact edited by government officials and with government facilities. Despite their importance, their circulation does not exceed 3,000 each.

Lacking access to government facilities, such opposition papers as *Indépendance Africaine* (organ of the *Parti du Regroupement Africain-Senegal*) and *Monsarey* (organ of the *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance*) are of considerably lower technical competence and have a limited audience and influence. In spite of heavy attacks on the government, opposition papers have not been curbed. There is a high probability that the *PRA* will finally be absorbed into the government party (just as was the *Mouvement National de Libération*, which also had its own paper), in which case the opposition press will further diminish.

Catholic Weekly is Influential

The largest and most influential weekly in Mali is *Afrique Nouvelle*, which was founded by the White Fathers in 1947 and is now the voice of the *Secrétariat social*, a liberal Catholic study group concerned with social questions. The recent replacement of the chief editor, Father J. de Benoist, by a Catholic layman was reportedly prompted by the dissatisfaction of the Archbishop of Dakar with the journal's liberal tendencies.

One of the major differences between the Archbishop and *Afrique Nouvelle* is on Islam: the newspaper holds that the quality of Christianity shown by the lives of Christians is the best and only possible form of missionary activity in Islamic Africa, while the Archbishop emphasizes the traditional evangelical mission.

Government Also Publishes

The Federal Ministry of Information limits its activity in the press field to the publication of a monthly magazine, *Le Mali*. Well-written and profusely illustrated, it contains descriptive material on the new state, editorials, and political analyses

aimed at presenting a favorable impression of the Mali Federation to the outside world. It is distributed free, mostly abroad. *Senegal magazine*, a monthly, offers in somewhat simpler form the same material as *Le Mali*, but is limited to the Senegal.

Pamphlets coming out irregularly but touching on urgent problems have also been issued by the Information Ministry of Senegal. There has been an excellent study of Senegalese history under the title *Trois siecles d'histoire*, a study on the constitution of Mali and the two member states of the Federation entitled *La Nation en construction*, a report on development plans called *Senegal de demain*, and an excellent presentation of *Senegal d'aujourd'hui*.

AFP is Prime News Source

All of the newspapers and periodicals of Mali are published in French,

despite the fact that publications in at least two vernaculars—Oulof in Senegal and Bambara in Soudan—would find a sizeable reading audience.

Agence France-Presse is still used as the basis of information in all three radio systems and by the press, and thus holds a near-monopoly on news distribution in the Federation. In Senegal, however, AFP signed a contract with the government on June 30, 1959 which calls for distribution of its material under the name *Agence Senegalaise de Presse*. A special *Conseil Supérieur*—presided over by a magistrate and comprising representatives from the Ministries of Information and Interior, two representatives of the Legislative Assembly, a professor from Dakar University, and two non-journalistic customers of the Agency's service—has been set up to assure the

impartiality of the news thus distributed.

One original initiative must be mentioned to give a full picture of information in Mali. "Regional centers of information," manned by reasonably-trained editors, have recently been scattered throughout Senegal and charged with the task of relaying government information to the people and local events to the government. At present, nine such centers exist in Saint-Louis, Matam, Kedougou, Tambacounda, Diourbel, Thies, Kaolack, Ziguinchor, and Podor.

The necessarily spotty training of the editors, the fact that some were appointed for reasons of party loyalty and not professional efficiency, and pressure imposed by local deputies and party leaders have limited the effectiveness of these centers. However, the erection of picture boards, where the population can follow what is going on in Senegal, the opening of modest reading rooms and libraries, and the frequent trips into the bush undertaken by the editors are increasingly influencing the formation of local public opinion.

Prospects for the Future

Although an international symposium of the West African press held at Dakar from May 31 to June 4 was strongly critical of the role of the expatriate press in the area, it is unlikely that independent Mali will directly challenge the presence of the de Breteuil group as long as *Paris-Dakar* maintains its present careful editorial line.

One immediately important outgrowth of the symposium, however, was the decision to set up a school of journalism at the University of Dakar. For the first time, it will be possible to train Africans on home ground in the craft of a profession that has so far been monopolized by amateurs or expatriates. The courses will last one year and certificates will be awarded to successful students. The first graduates will leave the university in 1961.

More difficult is the formation of capital for private journalistic enterprises. Indications are that government-sponsored publications will remain dominant, but with the influx of trained journalists these publications will become better and probably will lose a conformist tone that is not necessarily imposed but is often the result of lack of skills.

Although the press is now remarkably free, the tendency in Mali will doubtless be toward increasingly strong central supervision. This will probably not be achieved by force but by the merger of most parties and ideological groups. The role of the press, under such conditions, will be mainly educational, though criticism of the government will probably be excluded. In other words, developments in Mali will probably conform to the general pattern of the press in Liberia, Ghana, and other independent West African states.

Mme. Leonidia Adfano of Dahomey, President of l'Union des Femmes of West Africa, broadcasts over Radio Mali.

—Le Mali



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Seven French Areas Celebrate Independence

The quiet, bloodless revolution in the French Community continued apace this month, barely noted in the back pages of a world's press monopolized by other African developments of a more sensational nature. Between July 15 and August 15, seven more previously semi-autonomous African states of the Community acceded to full independence with France's blessing, and more were yet to come.

These were the developments:

July 11: The four member states of the Council of the Entente (Republics of Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, the Niger and the Upper Volta) signed with the French Republic, in Paris, agreements providing for their unconditional international sovereignty and independence through the transfer of the jurisdictions of the Community to each of these African states. "Agreements of cooperation" with France will be negotiated after independence is celebrated.

July 12: The three states of the Central African Union (the Central African Republic, the Republics of Chad and of the Congo) signed with the French Republic, in Paris, agreements providing for their international sovereignty and independence through the transfer of the jurisdictions of the Community to each of these African states.

On the same day, agreements of co-operation between these three African states and the French Republic, within the framework of the Community, were initiated.

July 15: A similar set of agreements was signed in Paris by the French Government and the Gabon Republic.

July 22: The debate in the French Parliament on the ratification of the agreements with the Central African Republic, the Republics of Chad, the Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, the Niger and the Upper Volta was completed.

August 1: The Republic of Dahomey proclaimed independence.

August 3: The Republic of the Niger proclaimed independence.

August 5: The Republic of the Upper Volta proclaimed independence.

August 7: The Republic of the Ivory Coast proclaimed independence.

August 11: The Republic of Chad proclaimed independence.

August 14: The Central African Republic proclaimed independence.

August 15: The Republic of the Congo (former French Middle Congo) proclaimed independence.

No specific date has yet been set for the proclamation of the independence of the Gabon Republic. However, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania has announced that its Independence

Day will be November 28, 1960. Assuming that Gabon becomes independent in the interim, all 12 sub-Saharan African states of the Community will be independent and members of the United Nations before the end of the year. (i.e., Senegal and Soudan) and the Malgache Republic took this step in June.

Ahidjo Says Cameroun Not Joining Community

President Ahmadou Ahidjo of the Cameroun Republic, concluding a two-day state visit to Paris on July 27, firmly quashed renewed rumors that his lavish reception in France indicated that Cameroun would shortly join the Community. He told a news conference that this was not in prospect, though he approved, in principle, the formation of groupings of African states.

Earlier in the month, President Ahidjo joined with Premier John Foucha of the British-administered Southern Cameroons to announce that a joint committee is being set up to study plans for reunification of the two countries on a "federal basis."

Rhodesian Disturbances Cause Political Shifts

R. S. Garfield Todd, whose liberal views on race relations in Central Africa led to his ouster as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia in 1958 and a subsequent break with the governing United Federal Party, once again found himself without a party this month—and for similar reasons.

The executive committee of the multi-racial Central Africa Party, which Mr. Todd helped to found in 1959, on July 28 disassociated itself from his unilateral action in joining Joshua Nkomo, exiled leader of the banned African National Congress, and two other African leaders in calling upon the British Government to suspend the constitution of the self-governing dominion of Southern Rhodesia and intervene with British troops to effect a peaceful transition from "undemocratic . . . unjust" government to a regime based on the will of the people. The executive subsequently announced Mr. Todd's resignation.

The controversial Todd-Nkomo letter, delivered personally to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in London on July 26, was sparked by the arrest of three African members of the moderate National Democratic Party in Salisbury on July 19 and the subsequent outbreak of serious protest disturbances in Southern Rhodesia's principal cities.

Although the Southern Rhodesian Government stressed that the early dawn arrests of the three high officials of the National Democratic Party on July 19—Michael Mawema, Sketch-

ley Samkange, and Leopold Takawira—were not directed against any particular race or political party, this was received skeptically by the Democratic Party. According to the *Central African Examiner*, the remaining members of the NDP decided to organize a strong protest demonstration against the arrests because they suspected that an attempt was being made to establish a legal base for banning the party. The three leaders were arrested under the Unlawful Organizations Act, and the NDP concluded that the government's intention was to prove that certain members of the banned African National Congress were associated together in the National Democratic Party for attainment of Congress aims.

The initial demonstrations of July 19 and 20, though many thousand strong, followed the opening-day call for order and discipline by Barrister Herbert Chitepo and other leading party figures acting in place of the arrested leaders. "Courage does not mean acting carelessly," Chitepo told the demonstrators, "and the most important thing will be discipline." However, according to the *Examiner*, the failure of Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead to receive a deputation, rising tempers caused by the strong police and army intervention, the arrest of leaders capable of maintaining discipline, a ban on all public meetings imposed July 23, and the infiltration of hundreds of youths and hooligans from outside NDP ranks led to the more violent disturbances which began on July 21 in both Salisbury and Bulawayo. By August 1, the military had imposed restoration of order, but it was already clear that Southern Rhodesia would never be quite the same again.

Nyasaland and Britain Reach Broad Agreement

The new draft constitution for the British protectorate of Nyasaland, initiated by British officials and an all-party Nyasaland delegation in London on August 4 after a surprisingly calm 10-day constitutional conference, calls for expansion of the territory's Legislative Council from 27 to 33 members, of whom 20 will be Africans. Executive power will remain with the British Governor, but three of the five unofficial members of his 10-seat advisory Executive Council will be Africans drawn from the Legislative Council.

The last-day communique, issued by British Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod, announced that the conference had recommended that "an immediate start" should be made on the detailed work required to implement the conference conclusions so that elections under the new constitution could be held "as soon as administra-

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tively possible." New franchise proposals would extend the vote to about 100,000 persons of all races, out of a total population of 2,700,000 Africans, 11,000 Asians, and 8,600 Europeans.

Although the Malawi Party's Dr. Hastings Banda did not achieve three of his original demands—a fixed date for self-government, universal suffrage, and a five-sixths African majority in the Legislative Council—he expressed approval of the conference results, reiterated his trust and confidence in Colonial Secretary Macleod, and stated that he was "going back home determined to work for the constitution that has been agreed upon." The compromises achieved go considerably farther toward meeting African demands than the United Federal Party of Federation Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky had recommended.

Dr. Banda and the other Malawi leaders still take strong issue with the Colonial Office's judgment that it is administratively impossible to hold a general election under the new constitutional provisions this year—i.e., before the review of the overall constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in February 1961. Malawi stands for the complete secession of Nyasaland from the white-governed Federation, and Dr. Banda thinks his voice would be stronger at the February conference if Africans could attend in an official capacity. He will continue to press for general elections by December.

South Africa May Seek Immigrants from Congo

Developments in the Congo dominated the South African press during July and August, with the opposition papers emphasizing the "criminal folly" of not training Africans in advance to exercise the greater political rights they will inevitably gain and the pro-government *Afrikaner*-language newspapers hailing the breakdown of the new republic as vindication of nationalist racist policies. The Capetown daily *Die Burger*, among others, was critical of the United Nations for "putting its nose in a situation" for which it was not designed, i.e., the restoration of order within the borders of a sovereign state. There was widespread concern for the Belgian refugees fleeing southward, however, and considerable hopeful speculation on the suitability of these refugees as immigrants for the Union. The Johannesburg daily *Die Transvaler* editorialized as follows:

"The refugees are all considerations apart whites—the struggle for the continued existence of the whites in Africa is a struggle which they learned to know from the inside. They stood in the front line—and now that they have been

forced out, they are retreating to the fortress in the south. In them the Union obtains a number of newcomers who are not in the need of any adjustment in getting to know Africa. When they will make a new homeland of South Africa they will fit in right away. On the basis of their nightmare experience, they will also from the start realize how necessary it is to settle the whites firmly here in the South. Despite the fact that they come without material possessions, they come with a thorough spiritual preparation."

Action Group Wins In Western Nigeria

The Action Group, which has been the governing party in Nigeria's Western Region for the last nine years, again won a majority in the August 9 elections for a new and enlarged House of Assembly. With 120 of 124 results declared, the Action Group had won 78 seats and the opposition National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, (NCNC) 42. The regional Prime Minister, Chief S. L. Akintola, was reelected, and it was assumed that he would be invited to form the new government.

The growing political role of women in West Africa was emphasized by a report that more than 56 percent of the registered voters in the Western Region are now women, and that the percentage of women actually at the polls was also very high.

South African Whites To Vote October 3

Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd of South Africa announced on August 3 that the long-projected referendum on changing the Union's status from that of a self-governing dominion of the British Commonwealth to a republic is to be held on October 3, 1960. Since only whites are eligible to vote in South Africa, the country's 12,000,000 Africans and Asians will not be involved in the bitter domestic campaign which is expected to precede the actual vote.

In announcing the election date, the Prime Minister emphasized that South Africa hopes to remain within the Commonwealth after republican status is achieved. Citing the precedents already established on this score by Ghana, India, and Pakistan, Dr. Verwoerd observed that a refusal of South Africa's application for continued Commonwealth association would be interpreted as "interference" in the domestic policies of a member country and would actually be aimed at the right of the white man in this country to retain control over what he has built up for himself."

Daily Changes Noted In Troubled Congo

A Chronology

July 15: First UN troops (Ghanaians and Tunisians) arrive in Leopoldville.

July 17: Premier Lumumba threatens to call for Soviet or "other" outside assistance if the UN does not get all Belgian troops out in three days.

July 18: Moise Tshombe, premier of the self-proclaimed independent province of Katanga, demands UN recognition within 48 hours.

July 22: The UN Security Council votes unanimously in favor of a resolution introduced by Tunisia and Ceylon calling upon Belgium to implement "speedily" Security Council Resolution S/4387 of July 14 on the withdrawal of troops. . . . Premier Lumumba promptly withdraws his threat to call on Soviet troops for help, and leaves for New York to discuss his country's technical needs with UN, American, and Canadian officials. . . . Lumumba is reported to have signed sweeping 50-year development contract with L. Edgar Detwiler's Congo International Management Corporation, New York.

July 23: The UN announces the total pledged force in the Congo at 12,140. Individual contributions include: Ethiopia, 1,800; Ghana, 2,100; Guinea, 1,200; Ireland, 680; Liberia, 225; Mali, 800; Morocco, 2,500; Sweden, 635; Tunisia, 2,200.

July 28: Premier Lumumba revives his threat to by-pass the UN to obtain the needed troops to save the "deteriorating" situation. Cheering Congolese greet Hammarskjold on his arrival in Leopoldville.

July 30: In a stormy meeting with Hammarskjold, the Congolese Cabinet demands that UN troops enter Katanga Province immediately, despite Belgian opposition. . . . Six o'clock curfew is restored in Leopoldville following new signs of restiveness among unpaid African workers. . . . Belgium announces it is withdrawing 1,500 troops to Brussels, leaving 8,500 Belgian soldiers in the Congo, but spokesmen refuse to indicate future withdrawal plans. . . . The UN and the Congo "duly initial" a "basic agreement" that the UN force will remain in the Congo until its mission of peace has been "fully accomplished."

July 31: The Soviet Union says it will take decisive "measures" against any NATO-backed "aggression" in the Congo and also offers large-scale economic assistance. . . . Congolese Vice-Premier Antoine Gizenga accuses UN forces of falling down on the job and permitting "secession to consolidate" in Katanga.

August 1: Premier Lumumba, concluding a nine-day visit to the US and Canada, tells newsmen that peace and

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Premier Patrice Lumumba confers with President Kwame Nkrumah in Accra, Ghana, August 8. —Wide World

order would come to his nation "five minutes after the withdrawal of Belgian troops." He submits a bitter letter of protest to the Security Council against Belgium and Katanga. Other African states urge him to withhold direct action pending outcome of Mr. Hammarskjold's efforts in the Congo. . . . Police restore order in various sections of Leopoldville, after pay-day disputes break out in some offices and factories.

August 2: UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold says UN troops will enter breakaway Katanga Province August 6. . . . The US State Department announces that a program of large-scale US technical and economic aid for the Congo, to be administered through the UN, is under consideration in Washington.

August 3: *Pravda* accuses Hammarskjold of dragging his feet in the Congo. . . . Katanga orders a general mobilization and again warns that UN troops will have to "fight their way" in. . . . Premier Lumumba, in Tunis, describes his country's foreign policy of "positive neutralism": "Africa is not opposed to the West. Africa is not Communist. Africa remains Africa."

August 4: Lumumba, in Morocco, demands all Belgian troops be removed from the Congo by August 8, or he will take radical measures. . . . UN Under Secretary Ralph J. Bunche meets with Katanga Premier Tshombe in Elisabethville, fails to effect compromise that would permit UN advance guard of technicians to enter Katanga.

August 5: The UN abandons tem-

porarily plans to send a military force into rebellious Katanga Province, and Hammarskjold throws the Congo crisis back to a hastily-called emergency session of the Security Council; *Pravda* decries "capitulation" as "absolutely intolerable."

August 6: Concluding a brief visit to Guinea, Premier Lumumba joins with President Sekou Toure in a sharply worded communique demanding either immediate UN entrance into Katanga or withdrawal of UN troops from the Congo so that Africans can start clearing out the Belgians. . . . President Kwame Nkrumah announces in Accra that Ghana will provide direct military assistance to the Congo Republic if the UN should fail to solve the Katanga problem. Observers believe Nkrumah's action is calculated to ward off any new threat by Lumumba to bring in Soviet troops.

INSTRUCTIONS PRESENTED UN TROOPS IN THE CONGO:

"You serve as members of an international force. It is a peace force, not a fighting force.

"The United Nations has asked you to come here in response to an appeal from the Government of the Republic of the Congo. Your task is to help in restoring order and calm in this country which has been so troubled recently. You are to be friendly to all the people of this country. Protection against acts of violence is to be given to all the people, white and black.

"You carry arms, but they are to be used *only* in self defense. You are in the Congo to help *everyone*, to harm no one.

"Your conduct should always be such as to do credit to your country and to the United Nations.

"You are serving the United Nations here. Your orders on this mission will come through your officers only from the United Nations.

"You have a great opportunity now to help the Congo and its people. In doing that you will also help Africa. We have confidence that you will do your very best here.

August 8: Gaston Kioni, official of Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu's Abako Party and Vice-President of Leopoldville Province, demands that Security Council reshape the Congo into a loose federation. . . . The Katanga Assembly unanimously elects Premier Tshombe head of state, but 21 members of the opposition Balubakat Cartel boycott the session.

August 9: Albert Kalonji, leader of the bitterly dissident wing of Lumumba's *Mouvement National Congo-*

lais party, announces that he is establishing a secessionist "mines state" made up of the richest part of Kasai Province and some neighboring territory. . . . Belgium's Ambassador to the Congo, Jean van den Bosch, is expelled from Leopoldville, and the Belgian Embassy and consulate are ordered closed. The Lumumba government also announces that some 150-200 Congolese students in Belgium are being recalled. . . . Lumumba calls the *Force Publique* back to regular duty, proclaims a state of emergency, and threatens an invasion of Katanga Province. He also confirms that an all-African summit conference on the Congo crisis will open in Leopoldville August 25. . . . Warned by Secretary-General Hammarskjold that a world war might erupt if the Congo crisis is not solved, the 11-member Security Council ends an all-night session with a 9-0 vote in favor of a resolution sponsored by Ceylon and Tunisia authorizing Hammarskjold to move Belgian troops out of secessionist Katanga Province immediately. France and Italy abstain. . . . Katanga Premier Tshombe announces his government will acquiesce to the entrance of UN forces, on 16 conditions, including (1) that none of the UN troops come from Communist or Communist-influenced countries; (2) that the UN does not intervene in Katanga's internal affairs; and (3) that Katanga have the right to prohibit entry of any person or body from the central government of Premier Lumumba.

August 13: Premier Lumumba bitterly protests UN "concessions" to Katanga separatism, demands that all white troops be removed from the UN force, and threatens to send the Congolese *Force Publique* to take over Katanga unless the rebellious province's adherence to the central government is clarified by the UN.

August 14: The Belgian Army turns over control of the Katanga capital of Elisabethville to an advance guard of UN Swedish troops. . . . Meanwhile, Katanga's provincial military police suppress political demonstrators from the opposition, anti-separatist Balubakat cartel. . . . Hammarskjold reaffirms that his instructions are to observe the principle of non-intervention in internal political affairs.

August 15: Premier Lumumba declares the people and government of the Congo have lost confidence in Secretary General Hammarskjold and asks the Security Council to replace him with an observer team from 14 African and Asian nations immediately. . . . Hammarskjold departs Congo, summons urgent session of the Security Council on the new crisis created by Patrice Lumumba's statement of no confidence. . . . Katanga Premier Tshombe invites Ghana President Nkrumah to mediate Congo dispute.

Portugal and the "Winds of Change"

By HARVEY GLICKMAN

Portuguese Africa, by James Duffy, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 389 pages, \$6.75.

Only a miracle can prevent "the winds of change" from one day blowing with hurricane force over those vast chunks of the African continent controlled by Portugal. Although every effort has been made to insulate Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea from outside influences, the borders they share with Guinea, the Republic of the Congo, the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, Tanganyika, and South Africa render this task increasingly impossible. Already reports of riots and suppression in Angola and Portuguese Guinea (the latter, unfortunately, only lightly touched upon by Professor Duffy) have reached the daily press.

But trouble lies ahead also because of the activities of the Portuguese themselves. Professor Duffy—not an unsympathetic commentator—is forced to conclude that "the weight of tradition rests heavily in Portuguese Africa. In spite of genuine material progress, the Portuguese presence in Africa today is characterized by ignorance, repression, and a careless exploitation of the African people, and in purely human terms the lessons of the past offer little hope for the future."

Poverty Induces Caution

Curiously, it is the refusal—and inability—to develop their African colonies that have permitted the Portuguese to avoid the political problems of their more ambitious co-imperialists. For misery alone does not foment discontent. Poverty, unrelieved by the possibility of respite or betterment, induces timidity and caution. Only "rising expectations"—the keynote of Africa today—produce demands for change. Thus the very progress to which Portugal aspires in improving economic conditions in Africa would seem to insure her eventual downfall as an imperialist.

Professor Duffy, who teaches history at Brandeis University, fills a yawning void. His study does not concentrate on African society under Portuguese rule—perhaps our greatest need—but it represents the first authoritative, comprehensive history of contact by Portugal with the land and people of Angola and Mozambique. And it is certainly the best study in English of the development of Portuguese colonial policy in Africa. The book traces the course of the Portuguese voyages of discovery, recounts the numerous attempts by Portugal to colonize the African coastline from the Gambia to Mombasa, introduces

the reader to a host of fascinating but forgotten Portuguese explorers of central Africa and, finally, dissects the myth and reality surrounding Portuguese claims and achievements.

Although by no means seeking an indictment of Portuguese policy, Professor Duffy presents irrefutable evidence of Portugal's colonial failure—in terms of cosmopolitan standards of welfare and in terms of Portugal's own missionary pretensions. While the cities bear striking testimony to Lusitanian residence, the countryside remains barely touched. "One is confronted with the seemingly time-resistant quality of native life . . . and the small visible changes which have been wrought there in almost four centuries of Portuguese presence."



The ostensible goal of Portuguese policy has been to "civilize" the African—by Christianizing him and assimilating him into Portuguese society. To this end, Portugal recognizes no legal difference between its overseas territories and mainland provinces. Here colonial theorists place heavy emphasis on the peculiar role of the (Catholic) Church overseas and boast of an easy tolerance toward matters of race, which promotes the absorption of Africans into European culture.

Forced Labor Cited

The story of Portuguese native policy is, however, as sordid as it is well-known (see, e.g., Marvin Harris, *Portugal's African Wards*): the pass laws, the beatings, the forced labor. Professor Duffy provides complete and scholarly corroboration. In the self-righteous guise of introducing the African to "the dignity of work," the administration requires him to spend a number of weeks per year in wage labor. Although subject to legal arrangements, local administrators are known to round up Africans by fear, ruse, and force when they are needed

in public works, plantation harvests, and in foreign mines.

An international convention regulates the supply of contract labor—for instance, to the South African Rand. Nevertheless, it remains "the step-child of a centuries-old policy in Portuguese Africa which, stripped to its essentials, has regarded the African as a working hand, call him slave, *liberto*, *contratado*, *voluntario* or what you will. . . . The Portuguese colonial administration is obviously not yet disposed to abjure its repressive exploitation of African labor . . . the indiscriminate use of the African for Portuguese profit."

Conversion is Aim

The *raison d'être* of the Portuguese presence is the conversion of the heathen. In a sense, Portugal has immersed its colonial works in the world-wide mission of the Catholic Church. So the Church directs the mechanism of assimilation by controlling the apparatus of education. The fact that merely a handful of Africans have attained *assimilado* status is as much the fault of stringent educational standards and a rigid, austere curriculum as it is due to deliberate government policy. Although profoundly influencing Portuguese policy and conduct, the Church has failed to communicate anything to the African "but a disembodied doctrine"—except perhaps an image of hypocrisy, as exemplified at one time by those Angola Jesuits who justified their slave traffic as a means of introducing Africans to Christianity through work on American plantations.

Finally, Professor Duffy damages the customary Portuguese claims to a policy of racial tolerance, dismissing their acceptance of miscegenation and inter-marriage as a "completely academic argument." It has little to do with native policy, which continues to view the African as a commodity. "Miscegenation in Portuguese Africa . . . although admirably free from a sense of shame which accompanied it in English colonies, still must be considered primarily as erotic expediency; it has become colonial policy only in retrospect."

Though poles apart on racial policy, the Portuguese fate increasingly intertwines with that of South Africa and the Rhodesias. These areas are, of course, linked economically. The ports and the manpower of Angola and Mozambique hold the keys to the commercial survival of their Commonwealth neighbors. Pronounced is the parallel between Afrikaner nationalism and "the imperial mystique" of Salazar's New State. From different directions but with the same weapon, the Portuguese and the Boers

approach identical goals of self-preservation in Africa—"a revival of the simulated values of an exaggerated heroic past."

Impending tragedy in Portuguese Africa grows out of the tragedy of Portugal itself—a country barely more developed than its overseas possessions, trying to stop history with manufactured mythology. The Portuguese have much to un-learn if their legacy to a future Africa shall be more than "devastations wrought by the slave trade, a score of moldering fortresses and scarcely visible vestiges of missionary work."

Race and Nationalism: the Struggle for Power in Rhodesia-Nyasaland, by Thomas M. Franck, foreword by James Callaghan, M.P., (New York: Fordham University Press, 1960), 369 pages, \$6.75.

Central Africa: the Economics of Inequality, by Shirley Williams, (London: Fabian Commonwealth Bureau, Research Series 215, June 1960), 33 pages, 3s.

Is there a fair-minded observer who still supports the present basis of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland? Reporters and analysts of the woes of central Africa grow in number and variety, yet they agree on one fundamental point: the only basis for peace and progress is the granting of meaningful political power to the Africans. That means loosening the federal bonds to permit greater autonomy for the component territories and practicing a policy of partnership that genuinely advances the interests of the Africans.

In probably the most comprehensive study of the problems of the Federation, Thomas Franck pulls together much that is familiar evidence and some that is not (it is both odd and remarkable that he does not utilize the work of predecessors, such as Leys, Dunn, or Barber) in making a devastating case against those in power. His starting point is unashamedly 'liberal,' but this does not bias his exhaustive exploration of original sources. And despite an impressive load of scholarly baggage, Dr. Franck writes in a lively, hard-hitting style. This is surely "must reading" for the Monckton Commissioners and it seems a shame that they must antique it if they act on the evidence and conclusions.

Dr. Franck, who studied at the Graduate School and Law School of New York University, remains particularly informative on legal and economic matters. In addition, he undertook an original survey of attitudes during his period of field research. (Again, oddly enough, he seems unaware of a similar, more ambitious project completed last year.) In all these areas, he lays the groundwork for necessarily pessimistic inferences concerning the future.

On the legal-constitutional side, Dr. Franck condemns the vaunted British

pragmatism in all three territories. "In no case was the protection [of African rights] made absolute or subject to judicially-reviewable standards." Furthermore, British justice scarcely exists for the African. Subject to punishment without trial, punished more severely than the European for comparable offenses, the African also is, in effect, compelled to work for others against his will—indeed in signing for a job through the Rhodesia Native Labor Supply Commission he "becomes some employer's short-term slave."

The pamphlet by Mrs. Williams, general secretary of the Fabian Society, ably supplements Dr. Franck's evidence on the economic side. "Any picture of the Federal economy . . . must start with the whole picture; the enclave of wealth in the sea of poverty," observes Mrs. Williams. Contrary to the publicized statistics in percentages, the gap between the two economies and the difference between the absolute incomes of whites and blacks are widening. The prime beneficiaries of the increasing rate of growth in the national income of the Federation have been the whites of Southern Rhodesia. In Nyasaland, the rate has dropped, not risen.

The highest paid African rarely can aspire to a wage above the lowest paid European worker. Europeans justify the situation by invoking the relative capacities and training of the two races, but Dr. Franck denounces the very basis of comparison. "Very few Europeans have ever done heavy manual work under African conditions. . . . How does a European know what constitutes a 'reasonable' standard of work for a man wielding a drill in 97 degree heat, whose only food has been a dry slice of white bread and whose body is filled with bilharzia?"

Sources of Conservatism

On the social side, Dr. Franck's attitude survey confirms the fact that the Europeans most threatened by African advancement—the lower middle class—are most intolerant on racial matters. Somewhat surprisingly, young people also showed up "intensely conservative," as were people who had grown up in an African environment. "There is a direct correlation between length of time spent in central (or, presumably South) Africa and illiberality in matters of racial partnership," he observes.

Neither author feels that the situation is irretrievable and both suggest reforms. But, as Dr. Franck indicates, formal equality will not suffice. Any legal standard (or even any active effort) that does not "differentiate in favor of the African . . . is almost certain to operate to the disadvantage of the African." Only a massive and basic stirring of the Europeans to the aid of the Africans in central Africa will save their country for all their descendants.

Eminent Nigerians of the Nineteenth Century, Introduction by K. O. Dike, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 98 pages, \$1.75.

An Introduction to the History of West Africa, by J. D. Fage, (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1959), 214 pages.

Anyone wagering on scholarship futures will do well to watch African history. The demands of nationalism, coupled with scientific curiosity, have joined to seek an African past. Although pioneers usually must content themselves with meager findings, many, of course, will cut their newly-discovered historical cloth to fit the coats they desire. We therefore must expect the resurrection of tyrants, princelings, and petty commercial connivers and their transformation into incipient nationalists and resistance heroes. Something like this occurs in *Eminent Nigerians*, "a series of studies originally broadcast by the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation."

Doubtless the mere recapitulation of the careers of hitherto unknown figures adds to our knowledge, but need they be refashioned in the success-images of Europe—shrewd businessmen, opportunistic politicians, pious missionaries? Squeezing old leaders into molds that transparently contribute to national mythology makes for charming tales, but it's not history.

Dr. Fage, Lecturer in the History of Africa at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, on the other hand, sticks closely to the accepted facts and he has produced a serviceable summary of the history of West Africa from pre-medieval times to the present. Most interesting, perhaps, is his treatment of the period before the arrival of the European. He observes that in West Africa "the original impulse for change from small descent-groups to territorial states came from North Africa." Local nationalists please copy.

SHORT NOTES:

1. *The Development of the Transportation Pattern in Ghana*, by Peter R. Gould, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, Studies in Geography #5, April 1960), 165 pages. Largely for specialists, but extremely useful in contributing to the study of economic development in general.

2. *Announcing—The Journal of African History*, edited by R. A. Oliver and J. D. Fage, (Cambridge University Press; US Office, 32 East 57th Street, NYC 22), semi-annually, vol. 1, part 1, May 1960. " . . . to establish a concept of African history extending from the Stone Age to the present day."

3. *Monthly Source List of International Relations Materials*, (International Publications Service, 507 Fifth Ave., N.Y.C., Vol 2, No. 11, August 1960. Special supplement on current African bibliography, largely from sources outside USA. Available free on request.

Visitors

GEORGE SULEIMAN PANDA, Permanent Secretary of the Sierra Leone Ministry of Lands, Mines and Labor, here on a 60-day US State Department leader grant. Programmed by the US Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs.

Four African youth leaders, completing their studies in Cairo, here for 60-day US State Department leader grants. They are: ZAKARIA NIMR YOUSUF of Fort Lamy, Chad, a student of Islamic Law at al-Azhar University; ADAN AHMED BOHANEH of Hargeisa, Republic of Somalia, a student of Commerce at the University of Cairo; RASHEED ABU BAKR GORMAN of Cape Coast, Ghana, a student of Arabic at al-Azhar University; and DAHIR ADAN KOSHIN of Djibouti, French Somaliland, a student at the University of Cairo. Their itinerary includes Washington, Atlanta, Tucson, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, Chicago, Columbus, Buffalo, Boston and New York City. Programmed by the African-American Institute, Suite 505, Dupont Circle Building, Washington 6, D. C.

JAMES J. MACHOBANE, head of Machobane College in Basutoland, travelling in the US with his wife until September to study techniques of intensive agriculture and mass education. They are here under the auspices of the Ford Foundation, 477 Madison Avenue, New York City, N.Y.

K. A. GBEDEMAH, Ghana's Minister of Finance, in the US to attend a series of meetings held by the World Bank concerning Ghana's proposed Volta River Project.

PAPA IBRA TALL, a Senegalese painter, designer, and student of architecture at Cite Universitaire, Paris, here on a 60-day US State Department leader grant. Programmed by the African-American Institute.

THIERNO-DJIBI THIAM, of Boffa, Guinea, a student at the University of Paris' Institute of Statistics, here on a 60-day US State Department leader grant. Programmed by the African-American Institute.

RENE AMECHIA, Secretary-in-Charge of the National Union of the Workers of the Ivory Coast (UNTCI), here until September 8 on a US State Department leader grant. Visiting Washington, Detroit, Chicago, Minneapolis, Denver, Sacramento, Los Angeles, Albuquerque, Miami, San Juan, and New York. Programmed by Laura H. Harris, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, US Department of Labor.

MOHAMED LAMINE KEITA, of Thies, Senegal, lecturer in the University of Cairo's College of Liberal Arts, here to do advanced study of International Relations under the auspices of the American Society of African Culture, 15 East 40th Street, New York City, N.Y.

CLIFFORD FRITH, head of the Department of Fine Arts at the Nigerian College of Arts, Sciences and Technology, Zaria, here on a 30-day US State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Department of State.

ROCCO KNOBEL, Director of National Parks, Union of South Africa, here on a 60-day US State Department leader grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D.C.

ALAN COLLINGS, Principal Assistant Secretary in the Tanganyika Treasury, here during August to confer with government and private organizations.

NATHAN SHAMUYARIRA, Editor-in-Chief, African Newspapers Ltd., Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, here on a 90-day US State Department specialist grant, programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1722 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. His wife is here with him to study nursing and social welfare under the auspices of the African-American Institute.

YIGAZU ODA, former General Secretary of the Ethiopian Teacher's Association and headmaster of the Schimellis Habte School in Addis Ababa, here to study educational administration at the University of Colorado. Sponsored by the International Cooperation Administration, Washington, D. C.

African Diplomats To Train in US Schools

A \$250,000 experimental program of diplomatic fellowships for foreign service officers of underdeveloped nations was announced on August 15 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Administrator for the Program will be Reginald Barrett, who for the past ten years has been in charge of the Nigerian Liaison Office in Washington and an attache for Nigerian affairs at the British Embassy.

The experiment, to be financed by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, will enable 21 selected young men to study at graduate schools of international affairs at Columbia and Harvard Universities and in Geneva during 1960-61. Spokesmen emphasize that it is a pilot project for one year only, but Carnegie "hopes that it can be succeeded by a more fully developed program." This year's group will include representatives from 14 nations, including Togo, Cameroun, Ghana, and Morocco.

African Art Exhibition To Cost Over \$200,000

Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia will be the scene of the largest exhibition of African art ever shown on the continent when the First International Congress of African Culture—including a Festival of Art and Music—is staged by the Rhodes National Gallery in May 1961. The Southern Rhodesian Government has allocated \$5,000 for the festival, which will cost a total of more than \$200,000. Many countries in Africa are expected to take part and it is hoped that works of art from collections around the world will be loaned.

Calendar

September 5-7: Third Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, in Hartford, Connecticut, to discuss "Patterns and Problems of Unification in Africa." For details, contact William A. Hance, Executive Secretary, African Studies Association, 409 West 117th Street, New York 27, N. Y.

September 9-11: Second Annual Conference of the Sierra Leone Students Union of the Americas, Inc., at International House, New York City, to discuss "Emergent Nations in a Polarized World: The Politics and Economics of Independence." Principal speakers: Dr. W. H. Fitzjohn, Sierra Leone Representative to the United States, and Dr. E. W. Blyden III, founder of the Sierra Leone Independence Movement. For details, write The Sierra Leone Office, 523 Dupont Circle Bldg., Washington 6, D. C.

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